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ABSTRACT Stock price manipulation uses illegitimate means to artificially influence market prices of 
several stocks. It causes massive losses and undermines investors’ confidence and the integrity of the stock 
market. Several existing research works focused on detecting a specific manipulation scheme using 
supervised learning but lacks the adaptive capability to capture different manipulative strategies. This begets 
the assumption of model parameter values specific to the underlying manipulation scheme. In addition, 
supervised learning requires the use of labelled data which is difficult to acquire due to confidentiality and 
the proprietary nature of trading data. The proposed research establishes a detection model based on 
unsupervised learning using Kernel Principal Component Analysis (KPCA) and applied increased variance 
of selected latent features in higher dimensions. A proposed Multidimensional Kernel Density Estimation 
(MKDE) clustering is then applied upon the selected components to identify abnormal patterns of 
manipulation in data. This research has an advantage over the existing methods in overcoming the ambiguity 
of assuming values of several parameters, reducing the high dimensions obtained from conventional KPCA 
and thereby reducing computational complexity. The robustness of the detection model has also been 
evaluated when two or more manipulative activities occur within a short duration of each other and by varying 
the window length of the dataset fed to the model. The results show a comprehensive assessment of the model 
on multiple datasets and a significant performance enhancement in terms of the F-measure values with a 
significant reduction in false alarm rate (FAR) has been achieved. 
INDEX TERMS Market Abuse, Stock Price Manipulation, Anomaly Detection, Kernel Principal Component 
Analyses, Multi-dimensional Kernel Density Estimate Clustering. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Stock market manipulation creates a false impression of 
stock prices through some illegitimate means [1]. It not only 
affects investor’s interest in the manipulated stocks but also 
undermines their confidence in the integrity of the entire 
market. Allen and Gale [2] classified market manipulation 
into three main types: action based, information based, and 
trade based manipulation.  Action based manipulation is an 
action rather than trading, performed by the company 
managers or executives who hold the supply of a well-
established product by increasing its demand and hence the 
stock price. Information based manipulation intends to 
spread a false rumor or release some inside information 
about a company or its stock with an intention to influence 
the price. Trade based manipulation on the other hand has 
everything to do inside a stock exchange where traders, 
investors or brokers buy/sell stocks at different prices for 
different volumes [2,3]. One of the major types of trade-
based manipulation is price manipulation in which the trader 
targets to influence the buy/sell prices of any company stock. 
It should also be noted that this type of manipulation is 
excessively used and hence has the largest impact on stock 
markets [3]. Additionally, unlike the first two types of 
manipulation that can be avoided by binding laws and 
regulations, trade based manipulation in stock prices are 
harder to eradicate [4]. It implements a variety of strategies 
like quote stuffing, market close, wash trade [4], pump and 
dump [5], ramping or gouging also known as Spoof Trading 
[6] etc. Several previous researches mentioned in the review 
section made few attempts in this field using both labelled 
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and unlabeled datasets [3,7,8] but failed to acknowledge 
the rare and expensive labelled dataset, diverse detection 
model for multiple manipulation schemes and the 
heuristically assumed values for the model parameters 
involved in the decision making process. The major 
contributions of this work are as follows:  
The idea for anomaly detection is to generate an adept 
model of the data distribution that can establish a clear 
manifold between normal and abnormal data instances. 
This research proposes the combination of distribution 
modelling approach using kernel techniques and non-linear 
transformations technique onto higher dimensions in order 
to create linear manifolds among data points. For non-
linear data analysis, KPCA is used to project the original 
dataset onto higher dimensions, sorted as per their 
variances. Once the KPCA forms a non-linear boundary 
among the transformed data in higher dimensions, the first 
step of the detection model is implemented. Although, one 
of the conventional approaches for calculating such 
transformed feature vectors aim to compute the 
reconstruction error and forms iso-potential curves as the 
decision boundaries which is limited by the highly 
computational complexity [9,10]. A rather simpler 
approach is to limit the number of extracted feature vectors 
(principal components) and to subject them onto the 
proposed multidimensional kernel density estimation 
(MKDE) based clustering algorithm for further evaluation 
in the second step. The proposed MKDE clustering helps 
in grouping the data into clusters (only normal trades) 
without asking the number of clusters up front [11]. The 
major advantages of using this approach is its decision-
making capability based on analyzing the patterns that are 
subjected being an anomaly without prior information 
about the location or the nature of the manipulation and 
also helps in reducing the total amount of computations. 
This can be achieved by clustering the data, without asking 
for the number of clusters upfront using the proposed 
clustering algorithm, which is now linearly separable due 
to KPCA transformation and marking the data points left 
unclustered as anomalies. A dataset involving thirteen 
different stocks intraday price information from multiple 
resources (both UK and US stock exchanges) and three 
distinct manipulation schemes are considered for an 
exhaustive evaluation of the proposed approach. A 
distinctive comparison of the proposed approach with the 
existing benchmark approaches and conventional anomaly 
detection techniques indicates a significant improvement in 
terms of detection accuracy, F-measure and a substantial fall 
in the false alarm rates. In order to check the validity of the 
approach in terms of non-stationarity, stock price data from 
both UK and US leading stock exchanges are considered. 
 The rest of the paper is organised as follows: Section 2 
describes different price manipulation schemes using real life 
examples. Then, existing relevant manipulation detection 
techniques are reviewed in section 3. Subsequently the 
proposed approach is presented in detail in section 4 followed 
by an experimental evaluation in section 5. Section 6 presents 
an analysis and discussion of the obtained results. Finally, 
section 7 concludes the paper and identifies future research 
directions.   
II. STOCK PRICE MANIPULATION SCHEMES 
Stock price manipulation refers to artificially influence market 
prices of stocks using illegitimate means. The intention is to 
manually, though illegally effect the current market price of a 
stock for potential benefits. Market manipulators tend to 
influence stock prices using a variety of manipulation 
schemes. A few of such schemes covered in this approach are 
traditional pump and dump and emerging high-tech schemes 
like spoof trading/ramping, quote stuffing. They are selected 
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FIGURE 1. (a) Illustration of the spoofing activity (Saw-tooth waveform) on 
25th Sept 2012 and (b) Snapshot of the pump and dump (Spike waveform) 
manipulation activity from Dec 14, 2011 shows an 8 % rise of 
Westinghouse Air Brake (WAB) Tech. price within 1 sec and return to 
previous level 3 secs later. (c) Snapshot of Quote stuffing activity from 01st 
Nov 2012 shows thousands of quotes been sent to flood the market from 
12:26:50 to 12:39:42 pm. As is observed the number of trades fell to a 
lowest level during this interval. 
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 (a)  
Snapshot from Dec 14, 2011. WAB prices 
jumps 8 % in a sec from $64.22 to $69.33 
and then reverts to $65 3 secs later 
(a)  
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because of their impact on the market and the increasing 
number of cases SEC put to trial [12]. 
One of the most prominent type of price manipulation tactic is 
Spoof Trading [6] also known as ramping. As an example, a 
manipulator wants to sell a stock at a higher price than the 
current ask price. The manipulator will enter spoofed buy 
order in a larger volume at a higher price than the current bid 
making other investors believe that this increased price is 
genuine thus expecting other legitimate investors to join. Once 
the order is matched, the manipulator will withdraw the large 
spoofing buy order then issue a sell order of large volume of 
shares at this manipulated price as shown in Fig 1(a). A 
manipulative spoofing order stays in the grey zone until 
disclosed, as the orders mentioned in the order book cannot 
guarantee which of them is real or fake. In the case of pump 
and dump, the manipulator begins by creating a high demand 
of a stock using false information [5] leading to  its price rises 
(pumped) and the manipulator sells it (dumped) when 
sufficient number of orders are added or when the desired bid 
price is achieved shown in Fig 1(b). 
   A similar trading manipulation scheme is quote stuffing, 
which usually happens in high frequency trading (HFT), 
where the manipulator uses high frequency trading algorithms 
to flood the market by quickly entering and withdrawing a 
large number of non bona-fide buy and sell orders [13]. This 
hereby creates a confusion among the traders about the amount 
of trading activity. This further affects the normal investors in 
delaying their trades especially the participants that do not use 
HFT algorithms and consumes a lot of exchange resources 
[14]. An example of such a case study has been presented in 
Figure 1(c). It can easily be comprehended that the number of 
trades fell to a lowest level during the time interval (651 
seconds ~ 11 mins) when abnormally large amount of 
quotes/sec (~10000 plus) were made [15]. As illustrated in 
figures 1(a-c), most price manipulation activities follow a 
trend of increasing the price of a stock by submitting non-bona 
fide orders, executing the sell at the manipulated price and 
then a rapid withdrawal of the buy order leads to a sudden drop 
in prices as well. As stated before, the implication of 
manipulation schemes like spoofing trading, ramping and 
pump and dump can be critical on the market [16]. A detailed 
representation on Spoofing shown in figure 1 frames up the 
rise and fall of prices for Demonstrate holdings LLC listed on 
NYSE in a total span of 1.3 secs [17]. The sale was executed 
at $101.32, which is around 8 bps up than the current bid price 
as shown in figure 1(a). Another manipulation case of pump 
and dump is illustrated by a spike pattern on Westinghouse Air 
Brake (WAB) Technologies Corp. where the manipulated bid 
price is moved 8% and reverted to its prior level in tiny time 
interval of 3 secs as shown in figure 1(b) [18].  
    A detailed survey report presented in [19] provides an 
insight into the modelling techniques used in financial data. 
Along with prediction, a vast number of research studies have 
been carried out on stock market manipulation detection. 
Since the financial crisis of 2008, Volatility Index reaching 
record levels, the flash crash of 2010 [20,21] and because of 
the abusive activities, markets have been highly monitored by 
market analysts, regulatory organisations and researchers. The 
following section will review existing research studies that 
have been conducted in trade-based manipulation that used 
both supervised and unsupervised Machine Learning (ML) 
techniques.  
III. Related Work 
A vast number of empirical studies have been conducted in 
stock price manipulation but most of them claimed significant 
improvements in the detection results either based on certain 
assumptions in their applied research or using labelled 
datasets, which makes it easier for the model to learn the 
anomalous patterns and provide better detection accuracy on 
the test data. 
Yang et al. [22] constructed a prediction model for the 
detection of stock price manipulation activities using PCA 
followed by a logistic regression representing the 
discrimination for the manipulated stock prices. However, the 
results obtained do not highlight the detection performance 
rather the prediction of the stock prices is given only. A market 
close ramping detection algorithm developed by Aitkens et al. 
[3] presented an empirical study of relationships between the 
market efficiency and the manipulations detected by the 
algorithm. The algorithm was able to detect manipulations 
according to the historical price change when it exceeds a 
threshold that was set as the 99% histogram distribution cut 
off of the historical price change during the corresponding 
time slot near the close of the trading session. A case study 
based on manipulated stocks of Dow Jones Industrial 
companies from 2003 was considered to identify suspicious 
trading activity in relation to stock price manipulation by 
Golmohammadi et al. [23]. Experimental results show that the 
proposed approach outperform other learning methods such as 
kNN, C5.0, neural network achieving an F2 score of 53% and 
out-performing them by a huge margin of 30% in sensitivity 
but fails to reduce the false positives. 
Ögüt et al [24] compared the performance of Probabilistic 
Neural Networks (PNN) and Support Vector Machines 
(SVM) with statistical multivariate methods like Discriminant 
Analysis and Logistic Regression. The dataset from Istanbul 
stock exchange (ISE) used in this research was labelled for 
normal and manipulative content making it suitable to employ 
supervised learning techniques. Results proved that popularly 
used machine learning techniques like artificial neural 
network (ANN) and SVM performed better as compared to 
the statistical multivariate analysis in terms of classification 
accuracy. In order to further improve the performance of a 
neural network, Leangarun et al [25] implemented a two-step 
method for the calculation of the feature set and then used a 
feed-forward neural network model for detecting pump and 
dump and spoofing manipulations. The dataset from the 
LOBSTER project [26] used by the model is a combination of 
level 1 and 2 at the depth of the order book consisting of 
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labelled data, normal trades from level 1 and manipulative 
ones from level 2. The model achieved 88.28% accuracy in 
the detection of pump and dump case but failed to identify the 
spoof trading case effectively. 
Cao et al [27] proposed a novel approach for stock price 
manipulation including ramping and pump and dump using 
Adaptive Hidden Markov Model with hidden states as 
anomalies (AHMMAS). The method claims an improved 
performance in terms of the area under the ROC curve and the 
F-measure, for the four features proposed over other 
classification techniques like One Class SVM (OCSVM) and 
kNN. Although, this research aimed to provide better 
detection capability for an anomaly in the financial data, it 
relied on the assumption that data is generated from a 
particular distribution and used semi-supervised training for 
HMM by calling normal and abnormal instances from the 
GMM distribution. However, this assumption often does not 
hold true, especially for high dimensional real data sets but 
could have been justified by using several hypothesis tests 
which could have been added in the research. Again, the 
derivative feature set used in this research are not calculated 
as per the definition rather just as the differential of the 
variable with time but did not considered the time gap between 
any two consecutive samples. The approach focused on 
decomposing the data using Dirichlet Process Gaussian 
Mixture Model (DPGMM) into different components defining 
normal and abnormal components and then trained a Markov 
model upon those components.  Furthermore, the research 
specified the number of decomposition components, which is 
misleading as the distribution of the normal-abnormal 
patterns, might overlap with each other, if the specified 
number is less or more. 
Diaz et al. [28] analysed and compared the knowledge 
discovery techniques of data mining such as linear and logistic 
regression for stock price manipulation. They modelled the 
returns, liquidity, and volatility as well as the news and events 
related to the stocks using logistic regression function defined. 
Although, the authors claim to detect stock price manipulation 
(inclusive to any specific scheme) using unsupervised learning 
over market moves like trading volume effects, liquidity and 
returns as part of a quantitative analysis, no account of specific 
unsupervised techniques used were mentioned. The authors, 
however, used intra-day stock data but considered average 
returns, average volume and average volatility rather than tick 
features that again make it difficult to specifically locate 
anomalous data. This knowledge gap between the statistical 
features and detection techniques leads to irregularities in the 
manipulation models developed and hence is prone to suffer 
from a higher error rate even for the legitimate trading activity. 
The authors also trained several supervised classifiers like C5, 
QUEST and CR&T for the same feature set and achieved 
higher detection results (Accuracy = 93%) but used no proper 
labelling in terms of the timing instances for manipulative 
data, as the time frame for manipulation from SEC 
proceedings was highly vague. Also, a subsequent analysis of 
the manipulation results was also missing from the work. 
Ferdousi and Maeda [29] applied an unsupervised learning 
approach called peer group analysis (PGA) to the stock 
manipulation and detected cases of manipulation with an 
acceptable rate of detection. However, they did not consider 
the change of peer groups over time, which decreases the 
detection probability when some members in the same peer 
group may gradually exhibit distinct behaviour from that of 
other members. Kim et al [30] extended this concept and tried 
to improve PGA approach by updating the size of the group 
with time and achieve acceptable detection accuracy (AUC = 
0.845) but failed to identify the exact location in time of the 
suspicious activity. Although they tried to generalise the 
concept of anomaly in financial data rather detecting 
individual schemes, a subsequent step should have been added 
to identify the type of the manipulation activity. Most of the 
manipulation schemes follow a sequence of patterns rather 
than a single event that can be identified as an anomalous 
behaviour, an aspect that is also missing from this approach. 
Recently, Wang et al [31] proposed the use of recurrent neural 
network (RNN) for stock price manipulation detection. The 
research proposes to leverage the RNN ensemble learning 
model by using trade based features combined with 
characteristic features of the stocks implemented. The dataset 
used in this approach are taken from Shanghai stock exchange, 
China. The research attempts to detect manipulation instances 
by training an RNN model using ensemble learning while 
following feature selection, modelling and prediction using 
labelled dataset. It also claims to outperform traditional 
methods by 29.5% in terms of AUC. Although, the proposed 
model made use of labelled dataset but failed to specify the 
manipulation schemes detected. Use of supervised learning 
approach makes the detection model biased and is always 
vulnerable to failure whilst a contemporary manipulation 
scheme is present. 
It is evident to state that many of the past researches using data 
sets having manipulated samples prosecuted by SEC or 
synthetically created, false detection rates for many of the 
proposed approaches have not been evaluated, which also 
challenges the integrity of the features used. Moreover, the 
success of the existing models was based on specific data sets 
and the lack of adaptive capability to capture the different 
manipulative strategies. To summarise, following issues in the 
previous researches are the major challenges in designing a 
detection algorithm for trade-based manipulation. 
• Use of labelled datasets which is difficult to acquire as it 
is rare and expensive. It further makes the detection 
model biased towards the given dataset. 
• Focus on specific manipulation scheme and the choice of 
specific parameter values necessary for the detection of 
the chosen manipulation scheme. This makes the 
proposed model biased towards a particular manipulation 
pattern rather diverse and lacks the adaptability towards 
other manipulation schemes. 
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• Most of the approaches have focussed on a limited 
number of stocks listed on a local exchange rather than 
platforms like NASDAQ and LSE where stock prices are 
effected on a global scale. 
In this research, problem formulation is carried out by 
analysing original stock price information, then adding three 
types of synthetic anomalies that correlate with the existing 
manipulation activities into it. Although the original data is 
injected with three types of anomalies per stock, a significant 
number of them are added at different time instants along the 
duration of the time series to check the robustness of its 
detection capability. The following section explains the 
methodology of the proposed approach followed by 
experimentation with the dataset having added anomalies and 
compares its performance with the some of the existing 
approaches mentioned above in the later sections. 
IV. Methodology 
The concept of manipulation detection in financial data 
revolves around the fact that since in a time series, several 
attributes of anomalous trading transactions overlap with 
normal ones [32], proper characterization of manipulation is 
required. It is worth noting that the stock price data is non-
stationary in nature as statistical properties including mean, 
variance and correlation varies over time. Such variations can 
be related with the economics of the market microstructures 
[33]. Hence, the intention of the proposed model is to derive a 
set of features linearly independent or uncorrelated from each 
other when transformed in orthogonal dimensions. It should 
be kept in mind that since financial data is not sparse in nature 
[34], a large computational complexity is involved with the 
conventional approach of orthogonal transformation by 
calculating the iso-potential curves or surfaces of the 
reconstruction error. To avoid this, input data is divided into a 
series of a particular length windows, followed by the proper 
selection and adaptation of the transformed orthogonal 
features. A second step of clustering based technique is then 
applied on to such orthogonal dimensions to identify the 
abnormal samples. Hence, the methodology of this research 
follows a two-step approach: Firstly, the input feature set is 
extracted based on the concept of capturing manipulated 
patterns and projected onto higher dimensions. Secondly, 
focus is laid upon to carefully select and adapt the features 
from the transformed domain. Finally, anomalous stock 
prices/trades will be detected by using multi-dimensional 
clustering techniques to cluster normal and abnormal trades. 
A. FEATURE CHARACTERIZATION 
As for any dataset, the amount of redundancy can be reduced 
only if relevant information is extracted from it. The dataset 
used in this research are the stock prices of thirteen different 
companies operating at NASDAQ and London stock 
exchange (LSE) from multiple sources. As high frequency 
components in financial data are more prone to manipulation 
activities, focus is laid upon extracting relevant features that 
can capture the effect of high frequencies along with other 
attributes like derivatives [35] and differences. For time 
series (stock prices) that consists of synthetically added 
manipulated samples, denoising techniques [27] is applied 
using wavelet transform. This is done to filter out the low 
frequency components in the data and the filtered output is 
used as a feature, 𝑥"(𝑡) where 𝑥(𝑡) is the input time series 
(stock prices). This is calculated by applying discrete 
wavelet transform (DWT) on the input data decomposing it 
up to first level [36] into detail and approximate coefficients. 
Detail coefficients represent high frequency components and 
approximate coefficients represent low frequency 
components. Furthermore, in detail coefficients 𝑋!,# where a 
& b are scaling and shifting parameters, to extract only top 
high frequency components, hard thresholding is inversely 
applied for a selected threshold 𝛾 such that the components 
exceeding the threshold are set to zero. The value of 𝛾 is 
selected using universal threshold algorithm [37].  
 𝑋!,# =	*𝑋!,#						𝑋!,# ≤ 𝛾0										𝑋!,# > 𝛾  (1) 
Inverse DWT is then applied on the detail coefficients so 
obtained and approximate coefficients to reconstruct the time 
series	𝑥.(𝑡), here. Along with this, a set of five individual 
features are also used where most of them computes the 
change between the two consecutive data instances that can 
help stabilize the mean and also helps in minimizing the trend 
and seasonality of the data. List below describes the feature set 
used: 
1. Input price series,	𝑓$ = 	𝑥(𝑡). 
2. High frequency component, 𝑓% = 𝑥"(𝑡). 
3. Wilson’s amplitude [38], 𝑓& = 𝑤(𝑡), 𝑠(𝑡) = 𝑥(𝑡) − 𝑥(𝑡 − 1) 𝑤(𝑡) = 	 *3 ∗ 𝑠(𝑡),													𝑠(𝑡) > 𝑡ℎ𝑟𝑒𝑠ℎ𝑜𝑙𝑑𝑠(𝑡),																				𝑠(𝑡) ≤ 𝑡ℎ𝑟𝑒𝑠ℎ𝑜𝑙𝑑 
Here, 𝑠(𝑡)is the difference between two consecutive samples. 
Typically, a threshold value of 3 bps is selected. 
4. Derivative of the input stock price [35],	𝑓' = ()(+)(+ .  
5. Gradient of the feature set containing high frequency 
components, 𝑓- = ().(+)(+ .  
B. KERNEL PRINCIPAL COMPONENT ANALYSIS 
(KPCA) 
Principal component analysis (PCA) is the orthogonal 
projection of data into lower dimension linear space such that 
the variance of the data in each projected dimension is 
maximized [39]. Despite PCA’s ability to project the data onto 
lower dimensions, its interpretability remains confined by the 
fact that components generated by standard PCA have added 
noise and exhibit no meaningful pattern that can be either well 
represented or visually observed in a linear subspace [40-42]. 
We propose the use of kernel PCA in financial data as it is 
essential here to uncover localised stock price microstructure 
patterns using non-linear transformations in higher 
dimensions that could account for main variability in the 
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temporal data. The role of KPCA also becomes crucial in 
avoiding the vulnerability of the stock prices during the long 
held position of stocks that sometimes introduces sparsity in 
the feature set. Figure 2 shows the sparse adjacency matrix 
representation [33] for such a situation with Apple stock from 
12:20:05 PM to 12:21:19 PM on 21st June 2012.  
Kernel PCA uses a non-linear transformation of the input data 
having ‘𝑑’ dimensions to the M dimensional space (M<<d) 
using kernel methods [43]. It does so by mapping the input 
data points to a higher dimension feature space using kernel 
trick, forming a linear/non-linear hyperplane and then 
reconstructing the data set in the decreasing order of their 
variances using standard PCA. 
An input feature vector, 𝒙𝒊 ∈ ℝ0 (𝑑=5 and 𝑖 = 1,2,….𝑁) 
having 𝑁	number of input data instances in the feature set 𝐹1- = {𝑓1$, 𝑓1%, 𝑓1&, 𝑓1', 𝑓1-} is first transformed to a higher 
dimension feature space 𝐹+2 (for 𝑚 dimensions in the mapped 
space) using a non-linear transformation, 𝑥	 → 𝜑(𝑥) where 𝜑 
is a non-linear function. The kernel trick, herein suggests the 
calculation of extracted features (principal components), 
covariance matrix (Eq. 2), and subsequently Eigenvectors and 
Eigenvalues in the transformed domain 𝐹+2, is possible 
without calculating the intractable transformation or mapped 
data point 𝜑(𝑥3) of a given input data instant, 𝑥3 [44]. 𝐶4!" =	𝐸)[(𝜑(𝑥) − 𝐸)[𝜑(𝑥)])(𝜑(𝑥) − 𝐸)[𝜑(𝑥)])′] 
Or 𝐶4!" =	𝐸)M𝜑N(𝑥)O𝜑N(𝑥)P5Q (2) 
Where, 𝜑N(𝑥) is centred at the origin or a zero mean vector of 
the transformed/mapped data points. In the feature space	𝐹+2, 
Eigenvector 𝑉 of the covariance matrix, 𝐶4!"can be defined 
and there are coefficients 𝛼3 	such that,  
Recalling the Eigenvalue and Eigenvector relationship from a 
standard PCA, we can write, 
Note that 𝐶4!" . 𝑉 is a dot product and 𝜆𝑉 is a scalar product 
where	𝜆 being the Eigen value of	𝐶4!". The length of 𝛼 can be 
calculated from the normalisation of Eigenvectors, 𝑉. 𝑉6 = 1 
or	‖𝑉‖% = 1. Using (2), (3) and (4),	‖𝛼3‖% = 1 𝜆3W 	. Now, the 
Eigenvector 𝑉 can be calculated by defining a Kernel matrix 
as the dot product of two feature points in the mapped 
space	𝐹+2, 
𝑘Y , can be further defined as the kernel function to calculate the 
inner product and can be substituted with the most commonly 
used radial basis function (RBF),  
For 𝜑N(𝑥3), 𝜑NO𝑥7P ∈ 	𝐹+2 and 𝜀 being the kernel bandwidth 
parameter, kernel components are amplified given their 
density estimate falls below 10% of its maximum value (7). 
This is done in order to increase the spread between the normal 
and abnormal trading prices in the kernel space, the effect of 
which can be seen in the transformed feature space. 
Where 𝒫8#,% 	is the density estimate of the data points in kernel 
space. By substituting (6) and (2) in (3), the Eigenvectors and 
values can be calculated. For simplicity, the value of the 
bandwidth parameter 𝜀 is considered as 1. The projection of 
new data points onto the mapped Eigenvectors or the principal 
components in 𝐹+2 is given by, 𝑡3 = 𝜑(𝑥3). 𝑉 which can be 
further simplified by solving (3), (4) and (5). The objective is 
to visualize the data points in the kernel space, increase the 
spread among data points and forward this effect onto the 
transformed space.   
Some of the major constraints in the implementation of KPCA 
are the choice of RBF kernel parameter and the number of 
principal components to be used. It is well documented that 
for anomaly detection using PCA, the number of components 
extracted should be such that the cumulative variance must be 
greater than or equal to 90% of the total variance in the 
mapped feature set 𝐹+2	[22,45]. This helps in reducing the 
uncertainty over the optimal size of the components used and 
will efficiently reduce the computational complexity of the 
overall approach. To deal with another constraint about the 
selection of the kernel parameter, an efficient method is to 
keep the value of 𝜀 fixed for a given input data [46]. The 
choice of 𝜀	is carried out in such a way as it maximizes the 
amount of variance for the considered number of principal 
components and minimising the reconstruction error for the 
projected feature space as proposed in [47]. Figure 3 shows 
the components extracted from KPCA applied to a set of five 
features for Apple data after normalization (for clear 
observation only first three components have been shown out 
𝜆𝑉 = 𝐶4!" . 𝑉 (4) 
𝐾3,7 =	𝜑N(𝑥3). 𝜑NO𝑥7P5 = 𝑘Y(𝑥3 , 𝑥7) (5) 
𝑘YO𝑥3 , 𝑥7P = 	𝑒𝑥𝑝^−_𝑥3 − 𝑥7_%2𝜀% a (6) 
FIGURE 2. Sparse adjacency matrix representation for Apple Stock 
feature set F0 from 12:20:05 PM to 12: 21:19 PM on 21st June 2012. 'nz' 
represents the number of non-zero elements present for that duration. 
Total number of data instances included = 720. 
𝑘YO𝑥3 , 𝑥7P = 	 b3 ∗ 𝐾3,7 									𝒫8#,% < 0.1 ∗ max	(𝒫8#,%)𝐾3,7 																																			otherwise	  (7) 
 
𝑉 =	o𝛼393:$ 𝜑N(𝑥3) (3) 
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of 𝑚	= 5 in this case). The dataset used, enclosed both normal 
and anomalous stock prices. 
C. MULTI-DIMENSIONAL KERNEL DENSITY 
ESTIMATION  
Multi-dimensional Kernel Density Estimation (MKDE) 
clustering based anomaly detection is a modified approach for 
anomaly detection via non-parametric density estimation for 
clustering [11]. It has the advantage that it does not require a 
priori knowledge of the number of clusters. The method 
suggests calculating a kernel based probability density 
estimation for a set of data samples and cluster them based on 
the following algorithm [11]. For an input data sample ‘𝐹+2’, 𝐹+2 = {𝑓$, 𝑓%, … 𝑓2}6 
The kernel density estimator used to calculate the probability 
density 𝑃r(𝑓) is given by 
Where ‘𝑚’ is the number of dimensions of the data to be 
clustered, 𝑓3̅ is the mean of ith data sample for  a total of 𝑛 
instances, 𝑓3 = {𝑓3$, 𝑓3%, 𝑓3&…𝑓32}6	and ‘ℎ’ is the smoothing 
parameter or bandwidth for 𝑚-dimensional input data. The 
selection of such a smoothing parameter forms an important 
entity in MKDE estimation. It is seen that for the same dataset, 
different bandwidth can have serious effects on the results [48]. 
The kernel function 𝐾(𝑥) is calculated via a linear diffusion 
process [48] leveraging a Gaussian kernel density estimator (Eq. 
9) as it lacks the local adaptive behaviour towards outliers [49], 
resulting in misleading bumps and hence flatten peaks and 
boundary bias. Although such problems can be solved by using 
high order Gaussian kernels [50] they are unable to provide 
proper non-negative density estimates [51]. 
 Given: 𝑥 = {𝑥$, 𝑥%, … 𝑥;}6 be a 𝑞 ∗ 𝑚 size dataset that is to be 
clustered after using KPCA upon five input original features and 𝑥3 ∈	ℝ2; the parameterisation of the bandwidth matrix ℎ as a 
diagonal matrix [52] is optimised again via diffusion estimator 
in [48] and evaluated using Asymptotically Mean Integrated 
Square Error (AMISE) [53]. 
D. DETECTION ALGORITHM 
The implemented of MKDE clustering approach for the 
detection of price manipulation incorporated with kernel PCA is 
summarised in Algorithm 1.  
   The algorithm for MKDE clustering works by first calculating 
the kernel density estimate for a given dataset using an adaptive 
smoothing parameter (ℎ), defined in the previous section also 
known as bandwidth. For a given set of data instances, if the 
difference between the mean of the estimate and the data values 
is less than the bandwidth, the given sample points are grouped 
into a cluster. For the remaining data points having a new 
estimate, the difference is again calculated, samples having 
difference less than the bandwidth (of the dataset under 
consideration) are again grouped into another cluster and the 
process continues. The algorithm is originally designed to deal 
with univariate data [11]. As there are seven dimensions 
extracted from KPCA in the financial feature 𝐹+< set used here, 
seven separate smoothing parameters are obtained for each 
dimension. The first problem that should be tackled with is the 
estimated multi-modal PDFs in multi-dimensions. In such cases, 
when multi-modal PDFs are generated, it is difficult to 
determine one mean value for the whole set of data points, as 
there are several means generated for the given distribution, as 
shown in figure 4 (each peak in a multi-modal distribution). 
Now, each mean is considered separately along with multiple 
smoothing parameters for each dimension. The implemented 
algorithm can lead to multiple clusters even within a compact 
group of data points. In addition, the cluster values for one may 
overlap with the one adjacent to it (depending upon the value of 
the bandwidth selected). In such a situation, the clusters that 
overlap must form a single cluster, but not if one of them is an 
anomaly as shown in figure 5. Such problems are quite common 
while dealing with anomaly detection in financial data [55]. It is 
therefore necessary to define a highly illustrious feature that can 
𝑃r(𝑓; ℎ) = 	 1𝑛ℎo𝐾w𝑓 −	𝑓3̅ℎ x=3:$  (8) 
𝐾(𝑥) = y 12𝜋{>0/% 𝑒𝑥𝑝w−𝑥6𝑥2 x (9) 
FIGURE 3. Components extracted from input feature space in ℝ𝟑 using KPCA including normal and anomalous data instances. 
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resolve the two clusters separately and adapt the clustering 
approach in this case. It should also be noted that there are a 
number of methods (cubic spline, gradient ascent etc.) to cluster 
this kind of dataset but very few to distinguish between normal 
and abnormal data, which makes such a problem of clustering 
based anomaly detection, a challenging task. Algorithm 1 
presents the possible solution to resolve such an issue of the 
multi-modal distributions.  
      After formal implementation of the above algorithm, two 
critical situations may arise in this case. First, if the number of 
left out data points considered are fairly large and more than one 
anomalous value in the distribution so obtained (forms a cluster 
of their own, given their separation, 𝑑 is more than the 
bandwidth). Such a problem can be avoided by using robust 
features and selecting a proper window size under consideration. 
Second, if the data instances are sparse as shown in figure 2, it 
is a possibility here that an anomalous trade may be clustered 
with the normal ones. To address such a situation, KPCA helps 
in reducing the sparsity of the dataset and is adapted to increase 
the spread among normal and abnormal data instances. The data 
instances that are not clustered are marked as anomalies. It 
should also be noted that the above described process is not 
Algorithm 1: Stock Price Feature Clustering and Anomaly 
Detection 
1. For any specific stock, extract the feature set  𝐹1- ={𝑓1$, 𝑓1%, 𝑓1&, 𝑓1', 𝑓1-}	 
2. Apply KPCA on the features considered and transform 
them into, 𝐹+< = {𝑓+$, 𝑓+%, … . 𝑓+<} 
3. For a selected window of samples (𝐹), construct their 
joint probability distribution 𝑃r(𝐹, 𝑡; ℎ)	; 	𝐹, ℎ	 ∈ 	ℝ< 
using multi-dimensional KDE approach [54] for 
bandwidth (ℎ).  
4. Construct the MKDE based clustering model for 
anomaly detection:  
a. Given: 𝐹+< = {𝑓+$, 𝑓+%, … . 𝑓+<},  for 𝑓3 ∈ ℝ is 
the feature sample. 
b. Set: Ȼ = ∅, 𝑡 = length (𝑓); where Ȼ is a cluster. 
c. j = 0;  
d. WHILE 𝐹 ≠ ∅ ; % 𝐹 is the set of data samples 
to cluster  
j = j + 1; % Iteration counter 
               % define the  
                   bandwidth ℎ and 𝑓̅ is       
                   the mean(s) location of  
                   distribution for the data  
                   samples 
e.              FOR i=1,2,3………𝑡 
       IF ~𝑓̅ − 𝑓~ < ℎ 
         Ȼ7 = Ȼ7 ∪ 𝑓3; % Add the set      	        of data for all the features 𝑓3 to        
         the Cluster Ȼ7  
         𝑓 = 𝑓\𝑓3; % Remove the    										clustered data from the      
         original set 
   ENDIF 
            ENDFOR 
                ENDWHILE 
5. In case of Multi-modal PDF as shown in figure 3, for 
the so-called clusters formed,  
FOR Ȼ3 =	Ȼ$: Ȼ7  % for 𝑗, number of clusters  
         𝑑 =	min‖Ȼ3 , Ȼ\Ȼ3‖; 
         IF 𝑑 < ℎ	&&	Ȼ3 ∩ Ȼ\Ȼ3 = ∅	&& ABCDȻ#EABCDȻ\Ȼ#E < 0.7  
% For every cluster Ȼ3, if it is not overlapping 
with the rest of the clusters Ȼ\Ȼ3, and if the 
ratio of their individual PDF at their 
respective means is less than 0.7 i.e. if the 
ratio is greater than 70%, they will be treated 
as separate clusters or else combined into one. 
             Ȼ3 = Ȼ3 ∪ Ȼ\Ȼ3; % Merge the clusters 
                           Ȼ\Ȼ3 = 	∅;  
        ENDIF 
              ENDFOR 
FIGURE 4. Bi-Modal PDF i.e. having two means shown for a subset of 
features {𝒇𝟏𝟏, 𝒇𝟐𝟏} of Apple stock for considering 100 samples from 9:30:01 
AM to 9:30:01.05 AM 
𝑃(𝑓 !! ,𝑓
"! ) 
𝑓"! 𝑓!! 
 
FIGURE 5. Probability distribution using kernel density estimate for a 2-D 
feature set ϵ {𝐟𝟏𝟏, 𝐟𝟐𝟏} of Apple Stock for 100 data points along with its 
contour  
𝑓"! 𝑓!! 
𝑃(𝑓 !! ,𝑓
"! ) Overlapping clusters, given their contours are separate  
Anomalous 
data instance  
f2 
f1 
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totally focussed on devising a new clustering method, but rather 
an approach to narrow down anomaly detection problem.  
V. Experimental Evaluation 
A. DATASET USED 
The dataset used in this research comprises of thirteen different 
stocks including Apple, Amazon, Google, Intel Corp and 
Microsoft for 21st June 2012 and others including Apple, 
Amazon, Microsoft, Google, Intel Corp, EBAY, Cisco, Netflix, 
Nvidia, Facebook, SIRI US, QUALCOM and AMD from 12th 
November 2018. It consists of level 1 tick data of stock price 
information along with its derivative for 21st June 2012 on 
NASDAQ Stock Exchange, USA taken from the LOBSTER 
project, [26] and the stocks from 12th November 2018 taken 
from Bloomberg trading platform, Newcastle business school 
(NBS), Northumbria University, Newcastle, UK. Figure 6 
shows the variation of the bid price for different stocks 
beginning from 9:30:00 to 9:30:52 from 21st June 2012. Such a 
data is selected for its high volatility, high trading frequency and 
the total number of trades per day (~ 1 million per stock) that 
makes it prone to manipulation as aforementioned. The database 
from the LOBSTER project, employed in this research is free 
from any manipulation activity [9,27]. Hence a synthetic dataset 
is prepared by injecting artificially generated anomalies similar 
to the ones shown in figure 1 into the data stream making it a 
combination of normal and manipulative trades. Since, the 
dataset collected from NBS has not been reported to have price 
manipulation yet; the results calculated from such are not 
compared with the existing researches in stock price 
manipulation detection.  
B.  EXPERIMENTAL SETUP 
The dataset varies in the size of each stock used, based on how 
they have been categorized into two groups; Group I having 
Apple, Amazon, Google, Intel Corp and Microsoft stocks, 
each converging itself within the range of 200,000 samples to 
a bit more than 800,000, for any one form of trade (Ask or Bid) 
from LOBSTER project. Group II having the stocks taken 
from NBS Bloomberg trading platform having more than 1 
million trades in Bid/Ask for a given day. Prior to using group 
I, it is made sure no abnormal trading activity was detected 
[27] and reported by any regulatory organisation for these 
stocks on the given day [9], marking it as a normal dataset 
without any manipulation. In order to check the robustness of 
the proposed approach, three different types of anomalies as 
shown in figure 1 complementary to the real life scenarios are 
injected [17] into this time series in significant amounts. 
Number of anomalies injected are also varied based on the size 
of stocks in each group. As the size of group I stocks varies 
considerably, it has been sub-categorised into Group A for 
Apple, Amazon and Google stocks as the average number of 
trades are limited to 200,000 and Group B for Intel Corp and 
Microsoft stocks having the average number of trades 
approximately equal to 800,000. Following this premise, 
group A & B stocks are injected with 100 and 200 
anomalies/type, respectively making a total of 300 and 600 
anomalies per stock with considerable spacing among them. 
For group II, since the size is almost comparable with Group 
B stocks, 200 anomalies of each type are injected in every 
stock making it 600 anomalies per stock. Such a configuration 
of synthetic data is practically accepted as per the business 
standards [56] and is then tested for the proposed model. To 
ensure comprehensive assessment of the approach, the 
detection is performed without a priori information about the 
location, amplitude and time span of the anomaly injected. It 
is also possible that a given anomaly will be followed by a 
rather similar, non-anomalous, waveform in shape but any 
prior knowledge about any succeeding or preceding samples 
is totally avoided. Once the transformed feature vectors 𝑭𝒕𝟕 are 
obtained from KPCA, they are windowed into a heuristic 
sample size of 500: 𝑭𝒕𝟕 = {𝑓+$, 𝑓+%… . . 𝑓+<} for 𝑡	 ∈ [𝑡, 𝑡 +500) and are then supplied to MKDE clustering algorithm for 
manipulation detection. Such a condition is further explored, 
and the detection results are calculated by varying window 
sizes. Furthermore, to improve the robustness of the approach, 
the displacement between the added anomalies is varied to 
check how the model reacts, if two different anomalies are 
placed closed to each other. 
     Most of the proposed approaches described in Section 3 
have claimed a considerable amount of detection accuracy in 
price manipulation. As some of the models [3,23,28] focussed 
on the detection of a specific manipulation scheme rather than 
presenting a general detection model, an adept comparison 
with such proposed approaches is avoided. However, advance 
computational models like AHMMAS [27], Naïve Bayes 
based model [23], Probabilistic Neural Network (PNN) [25] 
and Peer group analysis [29] were selected as the benchmark 
approaches for the proposed model. A performance evaluation 
metric defined for the representation of the results is Receiver 
Operating Characteristics (ROC) curve and the Area Under its 
Curve (AUC) [27,57,62-63]. It is also worth mentioning that 
FIGURE 6. Varying bid prices of different stocks from 09:30:00 AM to 
09:30:52 AM on 21st June 2012 
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although ROC curve evaluation is often used with 
classification approaches trained using labelled data, there are 
various instances of it being used in totally unsupervised 
approaches [57-63].  
The following section discusses the obtained results and 
analyses the pertinence of the model in manipulation 
detection. 
VI. Results and Discussion 
The ROC curves for five different stocks having added 
anomalies (300 and 600 for Group A & B respectively) are 
shown in figure 7. The tweaking factor that varies TPR and 
FPR values is the threshold applied on the output score. Here, 
the output score of the proposed approach is the difference 
between mean of each cluster and the corresponding sample 
that ultimately leads to the decision as to whether a sample is 
manipulative or normal. The AUC values in table 1 for some 
of the existing benchmark approaches in stock price 
manipulation detection are calculated only for Microsoft 
dataset for 21st June 2012. This is due to the fact that the AUC 
results for LOBSTER stocks (except for Microsoft) are not 
available from other models, so only Microsoft stock is 
reported. However, for some state-of-the-art models like 
AHMMAS [27], where all the details about the parameters 
used for the same dataset (and using a combination of different 
anomalies), the proposed approach is again compared for the 
rest of the stocks in tables 4, 5 and 6. AUC Comparison for 
specific manipulation type with the existing state-of-the-art 
models is made impossible since most of the existing 
benchmark models have not provided results under specific 
manipulation type using same stocks and replicating their 
models is made impossible due to missing parameters values.  
In order to check for the robustness of the proposed 
approach in detecting manipulations when two or more 
manipulative activities occur within a short duration of itself, 
the KPCA-MKDE based clustering model is applied on a 
dataset where the artificial anomalies are placed close to each 
other. Results are calculated after injecting same three 
anomalies described before, placed only 6 ms apart from each 
other. Table 2 shows a comparison of AUCs so calculated with 
the arrangement when they are separated 1000 ms apart on an 
average. It can be clearly seen from Table 2 that the fall in 
AUC values for a situation when the anomalies are placed 
sufficiently close to each other is not more than 8%, (Intel 
Corp data [Group B]). For stocks like Amazon and Google 
[Group A], there is only a small fall in AUC as <1% change is 
encountered in both the stocks. The derived inference from 
such results is that although there is a vast change between the 
two situations in terms of spacing among different 
manipulation activities, the robustness of detection model 
remains intact.  
The class discrimination capability of the principal 
components from KPCA was assessed using Kruskal-Wallis 
statistical test as it fits for mutually independent components 
and avoids the assumption that the underlying datasets are 
inherently normally distributed [64]. Chi-square is used as a 
test statistic here to evaluate the performance of the proposed 
method. In table 3, the 𝑝-values for every individual principal 
component obtained from KPCA for both normal and 
manipulative trading instances in group I stocks are presented. 
Smaller p-values (less than 0.05) obtained for every principal 
component proves the statistical significance of the proposed 
model using KPCA. However, since the significance levels are 
variable among all the components, manipulation detection is 
not possible by defining a single threshold. The detection 
ability of the proposed approach between normal and 
abnormal classes is further evaluated using the following 
performance metrics: AUC, FAR [23,27-28,57,62-63] and F-
measure [23,27-28,59]. The corresponding values for AUC, F-
measure and FAR are summarised and compared with the 
existing approaches in Table 4-6 respectively. 
Furthermore, the proposed detection model is repeatedly 
applied over group I dataset by varying window sizes to 
FIGURE 7. ROC curves for five different stocks. Group A (Amazon, Apple, 
Google) stocks show an identical behaviour in their performance that can 
be attributed to their smaller data size and the similar amount of 
anomalies injected whereas Group B (Microsoft, Intel Corp) stocks 
provide a different (almost similar performance within each other) 
compared to Group A attributing to the larger injection of anomalies into 
them. 
FIGURE 8. Varying AUC values with number of samples fed to multi-
dimensional KDE clustering algorithm. Optimal window length for 
Amazon, Apple and Google can be observed around 300 sample. Intel 
and Microsoft's AUCs rises with increasing number of samples. 
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MKDE based clustering. It is performed to reduce the amount 
of uncertainty over the number of samples to be used as an 
input to clustering. The evaluation assessment in such a case 
is again carried out using AUC as a performance measure. 
Figure 8 shows the variability of AUCs with different window 
sizes. It can be easily inferred from this figure that the AUC 
values for stocks: Amazon, Apple and Google rise with 
window sizes initially but falls when the number of samples 
exceeds a given value (300 samples /window). For Intel and 
Microsoft stocks, the AUC value continues to increase and is 
maximum when window size is 500. The average spacing 
among anomalies in this case is 1000 msec.  
A more exhaustive evaluation of the proposed approach is 
made by including other performance measures like AUC, F-
measure and false alarm rate for the same dataset. Table 4, 5 
and 6 mentions a comparative analysis of the KPCA-MKDE 
based approach using such measures. It can be easily 
interpreted from the tables that though the AUCs and F-
measures for the proposed approach surpassed the existing 
anomaly detection approaches in unsupervised learning, there 
are some downsides when it comes to false positives. As 
mentioned in Table 6, although some of the existing 
approaches have better FAR values than the proposed 
approach, the overall performance can still be appreciated as 
it provided significant improvement in terms of F-measures 
and AUC values. 
The proposed approach is also applied on group II dataset 
taken from Bloomberg trading platform. A more recent dataset 
of 11 stocks from 12th November 2018 is also considered from 
Bloomberg Trading platform in Northumbria Business School 
(NBS). The stocks considered here are selected because of 
their popularity and high trading frequency and the total 
number of trades (Average number of trades per stock per day 
~ 1 million). Figure 9 and 10 shows the F-measure and the 
False Alarm Rates (FAR) also called as FPR obtained using 
the proposed model. As it can be observed, the proposed 
model proves to be efficient and clearly outperforms the 
existing models for stock price manipulation detection. 
The experimental results obtained using KPCA – MKDE 
based approach achieves a higher rate of detection of 
manipulation of three types (Saw tooth, Spike & Square 
pattern) in stock price. Manipulation schemes like pump and 
dump, ramping and quote stuffing are carefully modelled by 
the time series following real life cases reported by SEC 
[15,17,18]. The results also outperformed some of the existing 
approaches for stock price manipulation detection and also 
some of the existing benchmark techniques for anomaly 
detection like PCA [45], K-means [66], kNN [67], OCSVM 
[67] and AHMMAS [27]. Such a performance can be 
attributed to the wider information content revealed due to the 
TABLE 1 
AUC COMPARISON OF PROPOSED APPROACH WITH BENCHMARK APPROACHES 
 KPCA-MKDE 
NB 
[20] 
PNN 
[22] 
AHMMAS 
[27] 
PGA 
[29] 
Microsoft 0.9143 0.8560 0.7977 0.7336 0.8289 
 TABLE 2 
COMPARISON OF AUC FOR ALL FIVE STOCKS WHEN THE MANIPULATION 
OCCURS WITHIN CLOSE VICINITY OF EACH OTHER 
 
Anomalies placed far 
from each other 
(1000ms apart) 
Anomalies placed 
close to each other 
(6ms apart) 
% fall in 
AUCs 
AAPL 0.9206 0.8773 4.70 
AMZN 0.9602 0.9539 0.65 
GOOG 0.8996 0.8923 0.81 
INTC 0.8680 0.7994 7.90 
MSFT 0.9143 0.8804 3.70 
 
TABLE 3 𝑝-VALUE FOR THE MKDE ESTIMATE FOR FIRST SEVEN PRINCIPAL 
COMPONENTS CALCULATED 
 PC1 PC2 PC3 PC4 PC5 PC6 PC7 
Amazon 1.22e-
08 
1.62e-
07 
0.0001 2.24e-
16 
3.34e-
14 
3.56e-
41 
1.28e-31 
Apple 5.91e-
18 
2.05e-
35 
7.36e-06 6.62e-
18 
9.57e-
07 
4.016e-
66 
7.52e-09 
Google 1.81e-
05 
8.37e-
42 
0.0523 0.04301 3.49e-
14 
1.052e-
08 
9.078e-
11 
INTC 4.71e-
26 
0 2.59e-43 0 0.0068 2.31e-
06 
0 
MSFT 8.59e-
11 
0.0052 2.05e-93 0 7.49e-
22 
2.56e-
40 
0.0037 
 
TABLE 4 
AUC COMPARISON OF KPCA-MKDE APPROACH WITH BENCHMARK 
TECHNIQUES FOR ANOMALY DETECTION 
 KPCA-
MKDE kNN [67] PCA [45] 
K means 
[66] 
OCSVM 
[67] 
AHMMAS 
[27] 
Amazon 0.9602 0.7982 0.9013 0.5799 0.8933 0.5152 
Apple 0.9206 0.7926 0.6902 0.5819 0.6603 0.5344 
Google 0.8996 0.5612 0.7993 0.6328 0.5911 0.5119 
INTC 0.8732 0.5469 0.868 0.5077 0.697 0.5169 
MSFT 0.9143 0.5509 0.8655 0.5047 0.6419 0.6711 
 
TABLE 5 
F-MEASURE COMPARISON OF KPCA-MKDE APPROACH WITH 
BENCHMARK TECHNIQUES FOR ANOMALY DETECTION 
 
KPCA-
MKDE kNN [67] PCA [45] 
K means 
[66] 
OCSVM 
[67] 
AHMMAS 
[27] 
Amazon 0.5559 0.1714 0.1568 0.0484 0.0284 0.0102 
Apple 0.6394 0.0344 0.0457 0.0708 0.0045 0.0012 
Google 0.5651 0.135 0.0806 0.0513 0.0196 0.0072 
INTC 0.6034 0.1014 00085 0.0119 0.0126 0.0175 
MSFT 0.6216 0.1148 0.0077 0.0141 0.0092 0.0279 
 
TABLE 6 
FAR COMPARISON OF KPCA-MKDE APPROACH WITH BENCHMARK 
TECHNIQUES FOR ANOMALY DETECTION 
 KPCA-
MKDE 
kNN 
[67] PCA [45] K means [66] 
OCSVM 
[67] 
AHMMAS 
[27] 
Amazon 1.22 0.14 3.9 7.33 49.54 9.22 
Apple 1.07 0.45 6.64 1.26 67.8 7.83 
Google 1.62 0.68 7.22 9.95 75.2 0.5 
INTC 0.54 0.23 57.29 0.02 59.08 1.15 
MSFT 0.71 0.08 49.89 0.02 77.48 0.52 
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adaptation of the principal components from KPCA by 
increasing the spread of the data points. Such a spread is later 
exploited by MKDE to cluster normal trades. The robustness 
of the proposed approach can be explained from the 
decomposition of the feature sets for a given length of the 
samples in a window using KPCA. In reference to the cases of 
price manipulation for pump and dump and quote stuffing, a 
sudden flip in prices after a long held position of incremental 
rise (within the selected window of data samples) in prices 
arouses an uncertainty over the sample length for clustering of 
the dataset. To further explore such an issue, variable window 
sizes were considered during the experiment with stocks and 
the results so calculated. While for Group A stocks: Amazon, 
Apple and Google, AUC achieved maximum attainment 
around an optimal window length of 300 samples per window 
for MKDE based clustering approach, Group B stocks: 
Amazon and Intel Corp. on the other hand continues to rise 
even if the window size is increased up to 500. Although, the 
research cannot contribute in explaining the possible rationale 
behind such variations in AUCs, further investigation into 
such a behaviour of the model reveals that Intel and Microsoft 
stock prices usually sustain a given value (piecewise constant) 
for a considerable amount of time rather than frequent 
variation as in Group A stocks. Figure 6 shows such a 
behaviour during a same period from 09:30:00 AM to 
09:30:52 AM for all the stocks prices.  The robustness of the 
KPCA-MKDE approach is capable to achieve higher 
detection rates even when several manipulation schemes 
occurs successively. Only a small change (<1% fall) in AUCs 
is observed for Amazon and Google stocks when the 
anomalies are placed close to each other (6 ms apart) as 
compared to when they are sufficiently far apart. Even the 
least AUC value achieved for Intel data (0.7992) in the former 
case is still close 0.8, which is considered better performance 
for a classifier [65]. The proposed model for manipulation 
detection performed variably for some of the data sets and did 
not attain very high values of AUC as it did for Amazon, 
Apple and Microsoft stocks. This can be attributed to the high 
variability of the data and the possible overlapping of the 
anomalies with similar waveforms that created large False 
Positives (FPs), nevertheless still managed to get AUC values 
higher than the rest of the existing approaches. Apart from the 
AUC results, the values from Table 5 and 6 elaborates the 
detection outcomes. It is observed that the F-measure values 
FIGURE 10. FAR comparison for KPCA-MKDE approach on NBS dataset with existing benchmark anomaly detection approaches 
FIGURE 9. F-measure comparison for KPCA-MKDE approach on NBS dataset with existing benchmark anomaly detection approaches 
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for the proposed approach are not very significant (although 
comparatively) in values (<0.65). Further investigation into 
such an issue reveals the degraded detection performance of 
the approach towards spoofing manipulation schemes. This is 
due to the drawback of the level-1 tick data being used, as it 
does not contain the order cancellation information. This is 
crucially informative as it correlates the price fluctuation 
(usually assumed high for spoof trading) with the volume 
change. This information can be included in a future 
investigation using level-2 order book implying the price 
volatility associated with the order cancellation may lead to 
improved F-measure and false alarm rates.  
To test the validity and robustness of the proposed 
algorithm, it is further tested on a recent dataset acquired from 
Bloomberg trading platform, NBS having 11 different stocks. 
The F-measure and FAR values generated are shown in figure 
9 and 10. It can easily be interpreted from the figures that the 
proposed approach outperforms the benchmark anomaly 
detection techniques like PCA, OCSVM and DPGMM. The 
major contribution to such a performance is attributed to the 
ability of the multidimensional KPCA-MKDE algorithm to 
distinguish between normal and manipulative trades and to the 
less volatile nature of the stocks included. However, the FAR 
value, figure 10 for Netflix (NFLEX) and SIRIUS stocks is 
degraded compared to OCSVM but is accompanied with a 
considerable compensation for the same stocks in terms of F-
measure, as can be seen from Figure 9. It is worth mentioning 
here that the computational complexity of such an adept 
approach is O(m3) to decompose the m-dimensional input data 
using KPCA using RBF kernel. Upon proper selection of the 
principal components, the total number of dimensions of the 
KPCA output have been reduced to 𝑑 dimensions. 
Furthermore, it requires only O(N.d.log(N) + 27) calculations 
for clustering using Multivariate KDE via diffusion [48] with 
‘N’ samples in a given window, 𝑑 variables and 𝑗 clusters. 
VII. Conclusion 
This paper presented an innovative approach for detecting 
stock price manipulation based on the combination of KPCA 
and MKDE based clustering. A brief review of the literature 
covering detection of market abuses has also been presented 
along with their limitations. This research proposed to use an 
unsupervised learning model for detecting stock price 
manipulation. To test the validity of the proposed model, two 
real world stock datasets comprising of 16 different datasets 
(13 stocks in total) were used and augmented using artificially 
generated manipulation cases. Principal components were 
computed, through a non-linear transformation using the 
kernel trick, upon a set of features extracted from the stock 
prices. The dataset is then time-windowed before passing the 
selected components to the MKDE clustering algorithm for 
manipulation detection. The MKDE clustering algorithm 
groups the multivariate input dataset into clusters based on the 
density estimate defined within a bandwidth parameter. A 
threshold value set up on the clustered region separates the 
normal and anomalous trading instances. Different 
performance metrics such as AUC, F-measure and FAR were 
used to evaluate the performance of the proposed approach. A 
comparative analysis of the proposed approach results is 
performed with existing price manipulation detection 
researches and also with existing unsupervised anomaly 
detection techniques. 
It can be easily observed that the proposed model 
outperformed existing manipulation detection techniques in 
terms of improving the AUC, enhancing the F-measure and 
reducing the false alarm rates while totally avoiding the 
labelling information. Such an improvement in the results was 
leveraged from the non-linear decomposition of stock prices 
using KPCA and further adaptation of the decomposed 
components. This helped in increasing the gap between the 
normal and abnormal stock trades in the transformed kernel 
domain. For further research, the performance of the proposed 
approach can be evaluated by varying the kernel functions for 
both KPCA and MKDE. In addition, the inclusion of the 
volume information for the cancelled orders using level-2 data 
will be considered for further enhancement of the detection 
performance. 
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